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Abstract 
We analyze TFP growth in the U.S. business sector using a basic unobserved component model 
where trend growth follows a random walk and the noise is a first order autoregression.  This is 
fitted using a Kalman-filter methodology.  We find that trend TFP growth has declined steadily from 
1.5 to 1.0 per cent per year over the last 50 years.  Nevertheless, recent trends are not a good guide 
to actual medium-term TFP growth.  This exhibits substantial variations and is quite unpredictable.  
Techno-optimists should not give best to productivity pessimists simply because recent TFP growth 
has been weak. 
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1. Introduction 
Technological change is the ultimate source of sustained growth of labour productivity and thus of 
long-run increases in living standards.  In a conventional neoclassical growth model, it will be 
represented by the growth of total factor productivity (TFP).  Growth accounting provides a 
methodology for estimating TFP growth and its contribution to labour productivity growth.  Viewed 
from the perspective of this growth model, the growth accounting measure of the importance of TFP 
is an underestimate since the rate of growth of the capital stock is endogenous and, in the steady 
state, is equal to the exogenous natural rate of growth.  Thus, a rise in the TFP growth rate induces 
capital accumulation and the steady-state rate of labour productivity growth is proportional to TFP 
growth.  So, the TFP growth rate is a fundamental building block for projections of the rate of growth 
of potential output.  In a world-leading economy (United States) this will be largely based on 
domestic innovative activity but in follower economies (Western Europe) there will be a significant 
contribution from technology transfer which exploits opportunities arising from TFP growth at the 
frontier. 
The mainstream method of making such projections is by a more or less sophisticated extrapolation 
of recent performance.  In other words, such methods embody a backward-looking perspective.  As 
the heat of the ICT revolution has cooled and then been superseded by the financial crisis and its 
aftermath, these projections of future TFP growth have been revised downwards.  An alternative, 
essentially forward-looking, approach is to try to evaluate the likely course of technological progress 
and it economic impact.  At present, this gives a relatively wide range of future scenarios.  On the 
upside, some commentators see a strong upturn in TFP growth based on the transformative scope of 
new technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics; on the downside, other voices say that 
the low-hanging fruit has all been picked or that the great inventions have already been made.  Such 
punditry is, of course, notoriously difficult, as is epitomized by Robert Solow’s 1987 remark that ‘you 
can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics’. 
The last few decades have seen big swings in expectations about future productivity growth, as the 
special century gave way to the productivity slowdown, which was followed by the new economy 
and then fears of secular stagnation.  Revised beliefs about long-term future growth prospects have 
the potential to generate shocks to aggregate demand in the short term if they are reflected in 
changes in planned investment or consumption expenditure because, in classic Keynesian fashion, 
they impact upon the desired capital stock or permanent income. 
In the light of this discussion, several questions arise which this paper addresses on the basis of time-
series analysis.  First, what has happened to trend TFP growth in the United States over time?  
Second, in past years, what would an econometric forecasting approach have predicted about future 
trend TFP growth?  Third, how would these ex-ante forecasts have compared with estimates of 
trend TFP growth produced using data from the whole of the postwar period and with actual 
medium-term TFP growth performance in subsequent years?  The results are used to provide a 
perspective on current debates about future productivity growth. 
Given the time series properties of U.S. TFP growth (high variability and modest autocorrelation), a 
basic unobserved component model, in which trend growth follows a random walk and the noise is a 
first-order autoregression, is fitted using Kalman filter methodology.  Four information sets, the 
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complete sample from 1947 to 2016 of TFP growth, a recursive sample, and two (rolling) fixed 
windows of length 20 and 25 years respectively, are investigated to provide a variety of forecasts of 
trend TFP growth. 
Our main findings are as follows.  First, over fifty years American trend TFP growth in the private 
non-farm economy has declined slowly but steadily over time from about 1.5 per cent per year in 
1967 to about 1.0 per cent per year by 2016.  Second, forecast trend TFP growth based on estimated 
trends over the previous 20- or 25-year window exhibits considerable variation and does not show 
monotonic decreases.  From a level around 2 per cent at the start of the 1970s, these forecasts are 
generally falling until they reach lows of about 0.5 per cent at times in the 1990s before rising to 
about 1.2 per cent in the mid-2000s, and then falling back to 1990s levels more recently.  Third, 
average realized TFP growth (adjusted for capacity utilization) over 10 year intervals – the horizon 
for which the Congressional Budget Office makes projections – has also varied substantially over 
time.  The outturn fell from 2.0 per cent per year or a little less for intervals starting in the 1960s to 
0.5 per cent per year or a little more for intervals from the early-1970s to the late 1980s.  It then 
rose to a peak of 2.0 per cent in the mid-1990s for the years encompassing the height of the ‘new 
economy’ before falling back to below 0.5 per cent per year for the period of the financial crisis and 
its aftermath.  Fourth, these 10-year-ahead outturns are not predicted well by forecast trend TFP 
growth.  In particular, sharp reversals of medium-term TFP growth performance are not identified in 
advance. 
These results provide a perspective on today’s discussions of the prospects for future American 
productivity growth.  Three points stand out.  First, medium-term TFP growth is very unpredictable.  
Recent performance is not a reliable guide, implying that the disappointing outcomes of the last 15 
years or so will not necessarily continue.  Second, a smoothed estimate of trend TFP growth has 
changed only slowly over time and is well above recent actual TFP growth.  This suggests that 
pessimism about long-term prospects can easily be overdone.  Third, given the substantial 
fluctuations in medium-term TFP growth and the likelihood that forecasts are confounded, it would 
not be surprising if revisions to expectations about future productivity growth are a source of 
significant aggregate-demand shocks. 
2. Literature Review 
It has been widely noticed that the productivity slowdown in the United States started before the 
financial crisis and has very largely been the result of a significant fall in TFP growth.  It is also 
generally agreed in the specialist literature that the slowdown is not an artefact of the data.  A 
recent careful review of the evidence (Byrne et al., 2016) demonstrated these points and its 
summary of the history of TFP growth is reported in Table 1.1  The mainstream view which is 
represented by these authors is that slower TFP growth in the recent past reflects a weaker impact 
from technological progress.  It should, however, be noted that an alternative school of thought 
stresses the role of ‘declining business dynamism’ (Decker et al., 2017) which entails reduced rates 
of business start-ups and job reallocation, possible explanations for which might include more 
onerous regulation or weaker competition. 
                                                          
1 Other papers concluding that mis-measurement is a minor issue and that the slowdown is real include Ahmad 
et al. (2017) and Syverson (2017). 
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Econometric investigations have concluded that slower TFP growth reflects a considerable reduction 
in trend TFP growth, although the extent of this fall varies somewhat depending on the data and 
techniques that are used.  Thus, using an amalgam of a regression approach and Hodrick-Prescott 
filter methodology, Ollivaud et al. (2016) estimated that trend TFP growth for GDP was 1.1 per cent 
per year in 2000, falling to 0.9 per cent by 2007 and 0.7 per cent in 2015.  Havik et al. (2014) 
employed an approach based on an unobserved components model incorporating a 
contemporaneous relationship between TFP and capacity utilization and estimated using Bayesian 
techniques and the Kalman filter, finding that trend TFP growth for GDP fell from 1.6 per cent at the 
turn of the century to 0.9 per cent by 2008, at which level it remained through 2014.  Antolin-Diaz et 
al. (2017) derived their estimates of trend labour productivity growth using a dynamic factor model.  
They concluded that this had fallen from well above 2 per cent per year in 2000 to about 1.5 per 
cent by the start of the crisis and to only about 1 per cent in recent years.  Their estimate of trend 
TFP growth in the business sector (plotted in Figure K.1(b) of their Online Appendix) declines from 
around 1.8 per cent in 1970 to about 0.7 per cent in the early 1990s before rising to about 1.6 per 
cent in the late 1990s and then falling to about 0.4 per cent by 2015.  They present their findings for 
the recent past as confirming claims that long-run growth in the United States has declined – in 
other words it might be expected that the slowdown will persist. 
Estimates of this kind inform projections of future TFP growth over 10-year horizons, which are used 
as a guide by policymakers interested in fiscal sustainability or the output gap.  The Congressional 
Budget Office has published such projections for the business sector regularly since 2002.  Their 
projection of TFP growth is produced by extrapolating the growth rate of the recent past, sometimes 
with ad hoc adjustments (CBO, 2001, p.56).  The CBO projection rose from 1.2 per cent per year in 
August 2002 to a peak of 1.5 per cent in August 2006, after which it fell back to 1.2 per cent by 
January 2011 and stood at 1.1 per cent as of January 2017.  The CBO has clearly been more 
conservative in revising its projections than the revisions to estimates of trend TFP growth discussed 
above would indicate.2 
All of these approaches to projecting future TFP growth rely on ‘backward-looking’ econometrics.  
They exhibit low variance compared with the (implicit) forecasts of commentators trying to predict 
the economic impact of future technological progress on a ‘forward-looking’ basis.  Both ‘techno-
optimism’ and ‘techno-pessimism’ feature prominently in contemporary discourse.  Among the 
optimists, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) stand out for their projections of the implications of what 
they call the ‘second machine age’ based on artificial intelligence, robotics and the digital revolution.  
They suggested that this will be more important than anything since the industrial revolution and 
will deliver an unprecedented rate of technological advance.  This would imply TFP growth of over 2 
per cent per year to outstrip the best decades of the 20th century.3  Their vision is supported by Frey 
and Osborne (2017), who undertook a detailed analysis of what jobs entail and estimated that 47 
per cent of 2010 employment in the United States has at least a 70 per cent chance of being 
computerized by 2035. 
Among the pessimists, the best-known is Gordon (2016).  Without much supporting evidence, he 
argues that, although there will be vigorous innovative activity, its economic impact will be modest.  
                                                          
2 The CBO does not reveal precise details of its methodology. 
3 An important caveat is the emphasis placed by these authors on the likelihood that a significant fraction of 
the gains will not be reflected in GDP.  There may also be time lags before the full impact comes through. 
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Robots and driverless cars will have relatively little impact on productivity performance.  The ‘great 
inventions’ are in the past and TFP growth over the next 25 years will be similar to the average of 
2004-15.  This would imply TFP growth in the business sector of around 0.4 per cent per year.  These 
sentiments are echoed by Cowen (2011), who claimed that Americans have lived off ‘low-hanging 
fruit’ in the past but that this is mostly gone. 
While Gordon (2016) sees the new technologies that comprise the ‘digital revolution’ as never 
having much effect on productivity growth, others, appealing to the experience of past general 
purpose technologies, see a gestation period before their full effect materializes, as happened, for 
example, when the ICT-related ‘Solow productivity paradox’ evaporated in the 1990s.  Van Ark (2016) 
provides a good statement of this position. 
Excessive optimism or pessimism by economists about future TFP growth is, of course, by no means 
unprecedented.  Alan Greenspan (2000) said in a speech that “When we look back at the 1990s from 
the perspective of, say, 2010 ... we may conceivably conclude ... that, at the turn of the millennium, 
the American economy was experiencing a once-in-a-century acceleration of innovation which 
propelled forward productivity ... at a pace not seen in generations, if ever.”4  Within a few years, 
this was revealed to be (widely shared) wishful thinking.  In contrast, Alvin Hansen (1939), in the 
presidential address that made famous the idea of ‘secular stagnation’, offered a gloomy view of the 
possibilities for technological progress, stating that “a full-fledged recovery ... awaits the 
development of great new industries and new techniques.  But such developments are not currently 
available ...”.  Yet the period from the 1930s through the 1960s saw the fastest TFP growth in 
American economic history which underpinned the post-war investment boom. 
Hansen’s real concern was that, in the absence of good news about technology and in the face of 
declining population growth, investment expenditure would be weak and the economy would suffer 
from inadequate aggregate demand.  Recent research has returned to this theme.  Using simulations 
of the FRB/US macro model, Blanchard et al. (2017) find that news of a decline of 0.1 percentage 
points in the CBO projected long-term potential output growth rate leads to a shock to aggregate 
demand of 0.39 percent of GDP under ‘model-consistent (MC)’ (forward looking) expectations in 
normal circumstances or 0.67 per cent when nominal interest rates are at the lower bound (LB).  The 
effect of a 0.1 percentage point decline in projected TFP growth would be larger.  In a Solow growth 
model setting, long-term potential output growth would fall by about 0.14 percentage points and 
the demand shock would be 0.55 (MC) or 0.96 (LB) per cent of GDP.5 
In sum, there is general agreement in papers based on econometric analysis of the recent past that 
trend TFP growth in the United States has fallen since the start of the 21st century.  In contrast, well-
informed commentators basing their claims on speculations about future technological progress and 
its economic impact offer a wide range of projections ranging from quite pessimistic to very 
optimistic. 
3. Data and Econometric Modelling 
                                                          
4 It is fair to point out that Greenspan noted that it was not possible to rule out the alternative that there was a 
massive speculative bubble, but the speech makes clear that he was a true believer that it was a productivity 
miracle. 
5 This assumes that steady-state growth is given by TFP Growth/(1–α), where α is the share of capital, assumed 
to be 0.3. 
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We analyze quarterly TFP growth for the U.S. business sector.  The full sample covers 1947q2 to 
2016q4. We make use of two series, one of which is a standard growth accounting estimate and the 
other incorporates an adjustment for variations in factor utilization.  The data are available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/economics/economists/jfernald/quarterly_tfp.xls. A full description of sources 
and methods is provided by the author in Fernald (2014).  The data are recorded as 400 x log change.  
Our main econometric analysis estimates trend TFP growth using the standard growth accounting 
estimate but in Figure 4 we also consider comparisons with actual average capacity-utilization-
adjusted TFP growth rates. 
Figure 1 shows the growth accounting estimate of TFP growth for the full sample, while Figure 2 
shows its accompanying sample autocorrelation function.  The series fluctuates widely around the 
sample mean of 1.26 per cent per annum, the standard deviation being 3.46 with a maximum value 
of 16.9 in 1950q1 and a minimum of –8.4 in 1980q2.  The series is also modestly autocorrelated, 
with a significant lag-1 autocorrelation of 0.18, but no evidence of pronounced seasonality or 
cyclicality. 
Consequently, given the relatively high level of noise and the limited extent of autocorrelation, the 
following basic unobserved component model for quarterly TFP growth, ty , was chosen to analyse 
trend growth rates  
 ttt zy    Tt ,,1   
 
t  is the level component and may be regarded as ‘trend TFP growth’, while tz  is the noise 
component.  The two components are specified as  
 
 ttt a 1     2,0~ at WNa   
 ttt bzz  1     2,0~ bt WNb   
 
i.e., trend growth evolves as a random walk with the noise being generated as a first-order 
autoregression: the notation  2,0~ WNxt  is to be read as tx  is zero mean white noise with 
variance 2 .  This specification of the noise is consistent with the autocorrelation behaviour shown 
in Figure 2.  This is a state space model and thus can be estimated as such using Kalman filter 
technology (all computations were performed using the State Space (SSpace) object in Econometric 
Views: see Econometric Views 8, Users Guide II, chapter 19, for full details).   
Estimates of the variances 2a  and 
2
b  and the autoregressive coefficient  , and hence the 
estimate of trend growth t , were computed using four different information sets: (i) the full 
sample    TT ,1 ; a recursive sample    tt ,,1   for Tt ,,100  ; (iii) a 20-year fixed rolling 
window    ttt ,,7980,   for Tt ,,80  ; and a 25-year fixed rolling window 
   ttt ,,99100,  .  Here 1t  corresponds to 1947q2 and Tt   corresponds to 2016q4.  The 
estimate  Ttˆ  is known as the ‘smoothed’ trend growth estimate, and utilises the full sample of 
observations to achieve an ‘optimal’ estimate of the trend growth component.  Because future 
observations Tt ,,1   are used in computing the estimate at t this smoothed estimate is 
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inappropriate for forecasting purposes and should thus be regarded as a ‘baseline’ estimate with 
which other forecasts may be compared.  The recursive estimate  tt 1ˆ   utilises only known 
observations to make a one-step ahead forecast of trend growth at t (the initial recursion uses 100 
observations in order to provide a sufficiently precise first estimate  100101ˆ ).   
The two fixed window estimates,  80,1ˆ tt  and  100,1ˆ tt , attempt to incorporate the possibility 
that forecasters use only a limited history of past observations, rather than the entire available 
history as in the recursive estimate.  20- and 25-year windows were chosen as a trade-off between 
using only recent history and the necessity of having a large enough sample to produce estimates of 
sufficient precision.  
Figure 3 shows the smoothed,  Ttˆ , and recursive,  tt 1ˆ  , estimates of trend TFP growth, while 
Figure 4 shows the two fixed-rolling window estimates (forecasts),  80,1ˆ tt  and  100,1ˆ tt .  Also 
shown in this figure is the 10 year-ahead outturn of average TFP growth (adjusted for capacity 
utilisation), computed as the sample mean of that series calculated using the previous 10 years of 
quarterly observations. 
From Figure 3, the smoothed estimate of trend TFP growth is seen to have declined slowly but 
steadily over time, from about 1.5 per cent per year in 1967 to about 1.0 per cent per year by 2016.  
The standard errors attached to these estimates range from 0.33 in the middle of the full sample to 
0.47 at the beginning and end of the sample, reflecting the well-known property of smoothed 
estimates that they become less precise at the two ends of the sample because of truncation effects.  
The recursive estimate displays a similar long-run movement but, naturally, is more variable, 
displaying irregular swings around the long-run declining trend.  Trend TFP growth based on 20- and 
25-year windows exhibits considerable variation and does not show monotonic decreases.  From a 
level of around 2 per cent at the start of the 1970s, these forecasts are generally falling until they 
reach lows of about 0.5 per cent at times in the 1990s before rising to about 1.2 per cent in the mid-
2000s, and then falling back to 1990s levels more recently.  The recursive and fixed window 
forecasts have standard errors that range from 0.43 to 0.63, although the size of the standard error 
does not have a simple relationship with t. 
The component model may be interpreted as implying that trend growth shifts permanently every 
quarter as new information becomes available.  An alternative formulation that was also considered 
is that trend growth generally remains constant, shifting only occasionally in response to discrete 
exogenous shocks.  These discrete breaks in the process may then be estimated using the Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003) procedure or its subsequent variants (see Econometric Views 8, Users Guide II, 
chapter 12, for details). These tests all select 1973q2 as a single break date, using which trend 
growth of 2.09 per cent per annum pre-break and 0.76 post-break was estimated.  These values 
effectively average out the smoothed growth estimates across the pre- and post-break samples 
respectively.  Such a ‘breaking level’ model is, of course, unsuited for forecasting as the (potential) 
break-dates are unknown before they occur 
The assumption inherent in our model that the level component follows a random walk rather than 
exhibiting ‘mean reversion’ was examined by allowing the level to be alternatively modelled as a 
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stationary first-order autoregression, ttt a 1 . The mean reversion parameter   was 
estimated to be in excess of 0.99, thus confirming the validity of our random walk assumption 
Average realized TFP growth (adjusted for capacity utilization) over 10 year intervals – the horizon 
for which the Congressional Budget Office makes projections – has also varied substantially over 
time.  The outturn fell from 2.0 per cent per year or a little less for intervals starting in the 1960s to 
just 0.5 per cent per year or a little more for intervals from the early-1970s to the late 1980s.  It then 
rose to a peak of 2.0 per cent in the mid-1990s for the years encompassing the height of the ‘new 
economy’ before falling back to below 0.5 per cent per year for the period of the financial crisis and 
its aftermath.  These 10-year-ahead outturns are not predicted well by using estimated trend TFP 
growth to forecast, as is apparent in Figure 4.6  Indeed, forecasting on this basis would have missed 
the productivity slowdown of the 1970s, the acceleration of the mid-1990s, and the slowdown of 
recent years – in other words, all the major episodes during the period! 
4. Implications for U.S. Growth Prospects 
Our estimates of trend TFP growth in the business sector based on the complete sample of 
observations suggest that it was about 1.0 per cent per year in 2016.  This certainly represents a 
significant decline compared with 50 years ago, but at the same time it is hardly the end of 
technological progress.  If this estimate is used as a basis for a medium-term projection of future TFP 
growth, it would be quite similar to the analysis of the CBO (2017).  If, however, trend TFP growth is 
inferred from a sample based on the last 20 or 25 years and this estimate is used as a basis for 
medium-term projection, then future TFP growth would be around 0.5 to 0.7 per cent per year, well 
below the turn-of-the-century level and quite close to what ‘techno-pessimism’ might imply, while 
the change since 2000 would be similar to that found by Ollivaud et al. (2016). 
In fact, past experience suggests that neither of these approaches is a reliable way to forecast actual 
average TFP growth over the next 10 years even when taking the capacity-utilization-adjusted 
measure.  This has exhibited a high variance, some sharp reversals and is not predictable.  A notable 
example of this was the surge of the mid-1990s, which reminds us that the surprises can be on the 
upside.  A repeat of this would quickly undermine belief in slow long-run growth.  The 1990s’ 
episode clearly owed a good deal to the end of the ‘Solow productivity paradox’ with the flowering 
of the ICT revolution after a long gestation period.  Growth accounting estimates show an increase 
of 0.36 percentage points per year in the contribution of IT sectors in 1995-2004 compared with 
1974-95; this was followed by a fall of 0.44 percentage points between 1995-2004 and 2004-2012 
(Byrne et al., 2013). 
There are good reasons to believe that this phased impact on productivity growth is typical of 
general purpose technologies (Lipsey et al., 2005).  Awareness of and excitement about the new 
technology comes well before it has matured to the point where it makes a big difference.  A true 
believer in the ‘second machine age’ could take heart from this and at the same time offer a further 
justification for ignoring forecasts similar to those based on 20-year or 25-year windows in Figure 4.  
Possibly, ‘techno-optimists’ could know better than econometricians. 
                                                          
6 This remark is not specific to our approach but applies quite generally.  For example, trend TFP growth as 
estimated by Antolin-Diaz et al. (2017) follows a rather similar path to that obtained using our 20-year window 
and therefore misses the key changes in realized medium-term outcomes in similar fashion. 
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This discussion suggests that as in the past there is scope for revisions to conventional wisdom about 
medium-term productivity growth prospects to affect aggregate demand and growth over the short 
term.  Bad news about future growth prospects has a negative impact on today’s consumption and 
investment expenditure.  Our results suggest that shocks of this kind may have been important at 
times over the last 50 years, including in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis.  For example, 
using the 20-year window to estimate trend TFP growth, there was an increase of about 0.5 
percentage points in three years in the late 1990s and similar decreases in the early 1980s and 
around 2010.  These moves are larger than those embodied in the projections made by the 
Congressional Budget Office, which almost never change by more than 0.2 percentage points over 
three years.7 
Given that steady-state growth in potential output is a multiple of about 1.4 times the TFP growth 
rate, these shocks are non-trivial according to the estimates of Blanchard et al. (2017) reported 
above.  A change in projected TFP growth of 0.5 percentage points over three years represents a 
demand shock of about 2.75 per cent of GDP (0.9 per cent per year) in normal circumstances but 
around 4.8 per cent at the lower bound.  This suggests that reduced expectations of future growth 
may have played an important part in the resort to unconventional monetary policy during recovery 
from the financial crisis.  By the same token, the ICT-based upturn in TFP growth during the 1990s 
implied a strong positive demand shock as would a general switch to ‘techno-optimism’ in future. 
What, if any, are the implications of this discussion for the interpretation of recent productivity 
performance and future growth prospects in European countries (many of which including France, 
Germany and the UK have experienced serious slowdowns in TFP growth recently)?  This is not 
altogether clear.  If U.S. TFP growth is dominated by changes in the rate of technological progress 
and new technologies are quickly and effectively adopted by European countries, then European 
prospects also depend on whether the techno-optimists or techno-pessimists are vindicated.  
Notably, employment structures are such that OECD countries have quite similar proportions of 
tasks that might be replaced by robots (Arntz et al., 2016).  If, however, American TFP growth is 
undermined by declining business dynamism and/or Europe engages vigorously in structural reform 
then future TFP performance may well diverge.  Similarly, the financial crisis has significantly 
impaired TFP growth in some countries and may continue to do so for a while yet and this also 
complicates matters since a simple technological interpretation of recent trends is incomplete.8 
5. Conclusions 
Our smoothed estimate of the trend rate of TFP growth has declined persistently but slowly over the 
last 50 years and is now about 1 per cent per year.  This is similar to projections of the average rate 
of TFP growth over the next 10 years made by the Congressional Budget Office (2017).  The estimate 
of trend TFP growth is, however, sensitive to the econometric methodology employed, since trends 
inferred from 20- or 25-year windows are appreciably lower and have fallen considerably since 2007 
to around 0.5 – 0.7 per cent per year.   
                                                          
7 The only exception to this is a reduction of 0.3 percentage points between August 2015 and August 2016 
(CBO, 2017). 
8 There are important papers which find evidence of significant adverse effects of the crisis, for example, Duval 
et al. (2017) and Gamberoni et al. (2016), but there is not yet a comprehensive account of its implications for 
comparative productivity performance. 
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Average annual TFP growth over 10-year periods, however, varies a lot – the range is from 0.4 to 2.0 
per cent per year in the last 50 years – and exhibits sharp fluctuations.  Not surprisingly, estimates of 
trend TFP growth based on ex-ante information are not good predictors of medium-term future TFP 
growth.  Moreover, they have the inherent weakness of being unable to take account of information 
on technology futures.  This suggests that the productivity slowdown may not be as firmly 
entrenched as is sometimes believed and expectations about future growth prospects could change 
significantly in a short space of time.  Techno-optimism should not be dismissed simply on the basis 
of econometrics; past performance is not a good guide to future medium-term TFP growth.  Our 
analysis suggests that the case for assuming that slow TFP growth is the ‘new normal’ is ‘not proven’.  
More generally, it seems likely that revisions to beliefs about future TFP growth have been and will 
continue to be important sources of shocks to aggregate demand. 
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Table 1.  TFP Growth in the U.S. Business Sector, 1947-2015 (average rate, % per annum) 
1947q2 – 1973q1 2.10 
1973q1 – 1995q1 0.52 
1995q1 - 2004q1 1.99 
2004q1 - 2015q1 0.48 
 
Source: Byrne et al. (2016) 
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Figure 1 U.S. TFP growth: per cent per annum, 1947q1 – 2016q4: source Fernald (2014). 
 
 
Figure 2 Sample autocorrelations of U.S. TFP growth with two standard error bounds ( 12.0 ). 
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Figure 3 Trend TFP growth estimates  Ttˆ  (smoothed) and  ttˆ  (rolling): 1967 – 2016). 
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Figure 4 Trend TFP growth estimates  80,ˆ tt  (fixed 20-year window) and  100,ˆ tt  (fixed 25-
year window) plus 10-year ahead projection of average TFP growth adjusted for 
capacity utilization: 1975 – 2016. 
 
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Trend tfp growth based on a fixed 20 year sample
Trend tfp growth based on a fixed 25 year sample
10 year ahead projection of average tfp growth adjusted for capacity util ization
% p.a.
